Love this! We need more journals solely encouraging the publication of great descriptive research regardless. This is worth aligning incentives around.
Love this! We need more journals solely encouraging the publication of great descriptive research regardless of study outcomes. This is worth aligning incentives around.
Nice. This sort of awareness is lacking in other disciplines too. People so badly desire to eliminate uncertainty that they’ll make up just about anything to avoid the experience.
I was going to add a comment on the role of hastily concocted theories as a quick (and self-reinforcing) fix for uncertainty aversion but I see you already did. Consider your comment “+1”ed 😎
What if the problem isn't too little or too many but rather no appreciation of what genuine theory should offer–predictive power, underlying mechanisms, falsifiable hypotheses? To take the example you used, stereotype threat describes outcomes but does not provide deep explanatory mechanisms beyond pointing to anxiety and cognitive load.
Attributing anthropological notions rooted in culture, language, and social cognition–in our case, stereotypes–to direct physiological responses conflates subjective cultural constructs with objective biological mechanisms. It's a clear-cut category error between subjective versus objective domains.
What actually triggers the physiological response is not the stereotype itself, but rather an internal representation—the person’s mental model, anticipation of judgment, self-monitoring, or anxiety. Attributing physiological effects to stereotypes without intermediates is an epistemological misstep.
What the field needs is the foresight to spot these nuances early on before wasting precious time and resources on extensive empirical data and rigorous testing disproving an isolated theory which is actually better conceptualized as a culturally-mediated psychological phenomenon manifesting physiologically via universal mechanisms. Stereotype threat didn't spectacularly fail as a theory, but rather the field spectacularly failed in ever recognizing it as one.
“Popper used to begin his lecture course on the philosophy of science by asking the students simply to ‘observe.’ Then he would wait in silence for one of them to ask what they were supposed to observe… Scientific observation is impossible without pre-existing knowledge… Therefore, theory has to come first. It has to be conjectured, not derived.”
— David Deutsch, The Beginning of Infinity, p. 403
The essay is deeply Popperian, whether it knows it or not. The critique of premature theory canonization and the call to return to careful, humble description are exactly Popper’s core message: theories must be conjectured and criticized, not installed as dogma.
The problem isn’t theory itself, but when the theory outruns and doesn’t seek criticism. When we become invested in its elegance, not its falsifiability.
Observation without theory is blind.
Theory without Popperian falsifiability is blinding.
One of things that I really liked about affective (and cognitive) neuroscience when I started delving into it in the 2000’s was how data-grounded it was. Very few researchers were out to prove theoretical positions, and there was a refreshing absence of grand theories (such as Piaget’s in child psychology). It had struck me that some of the most influential theories, the ones always included in the textbooks, had relatively little empirical support (and in some cases, were unfallsifiable). Theories can be very useful in organizing data into a larger structure and in pointing possible ways forward, but I agree with you, there’ve been too many theories put forward in psychology before they’ve been validated and more fully developed. Perhaps the real problem is not that they’ve been put forward, but that they’ve been widely disseminated and “popularized” before they merit it.
Genuine question: Are there theoretical social psychologists & experimental social psychologists, Michael? Or are they sort of mish-mashed together?
I ask because in physics we have two main branches: theoretical physics and experimental physics. Theoretical physicists spend all day trying to come up with new theories, and experimental physicists test those theories to see which ones cut the mustard (or rather, which ones do not). While theoretical physicists and experimental physicists do work together, they have distinct roles. They are separate careers, with separate conferences, and separate research groups.
When you write:
"When does an effect occur? How robust is it? What are its boundary conditions? These aren't trivial questions."
In my mind, you are describing an experimental scientist, or, at least, that is what popped up in my head!
Great question, Alex. In social psychology there is no split between theorists and experimentalists, but many of us have often pined for such a world. Instead, we're expected to be good at both, but the result is often thar we're often middling at both!
Please write more about the science of motivation! It is faintly hilarious that it’s unclear from your text if you volunteered lead an organization that studies motivation, or just abided.
LOL! You are picking up the right vibes, Steve. Are you familiar with the story of the gentile who goes to his town's rabbi because he wants to convert to Judaism? The rabbis slams the door on this poor soul's face. The gentile keeps coming back, getting the door slammed in his face again and again. Finally, after months of this, the rabbi opens the door and says "Fine, you're clearly serious about this." Except in my case, I was the rabbi. The Society kept asking me to be president, I kept saying no, and eventually I was like "Fine, you're clearly serious about this." Let's say I was testing their motivation. And, yes, you can call me your rabbi.
Serious question: is there any good lay person research introducing the current research understanding of motivation?
It seems particularly interesting because it’s an area where there is a huge amount of lay opinion, we have all these words for it (type A, go getter), but I poked around and the professional seemed very weak!
What is “motivation” or “drive”? Why does it seem to be related to coffee?
How do philosophers and psychologists view it differently than normal people? Why are “driven” people often driven in unrelated fields, like medicine and marathons, etc.
The dude was definitely not motivated. But, all your questions are great and I don't think I have any good answers. Perhaps my first real act as president will be to put together a symposium on what the hell motivation even is! Here is one paper I like that exposes the vacuousness of the concept: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38232956/
I must admit that I have not listened to it yet...but when Yoel told me about it, I was less than impressed by what I heard. From his telling, it sounded like they reinvented cybernetics without realizing it...
„You need some provisional hypotheses to know what's worth studying, what’s worth observing.” - recently I often think about one class of philosophy of science about problem of induction. Because it’s not logically possible to make any conclusions from the past what will happen in the future, it’s also not possible to falsify something definitively. Therefore it’s not right or wrong answer to the question of what’s worth studying, because hypothesis rejected in the past still can come true in the future - the only valid reason to choose one hypothesis over another or one science project over another (even if this is heliocentrism over geocentrism) is subjective perception what is most likely to bring useful results and advance science.
I’d like to elaborate further: that class delivered absolutely mindbreaking revelation, that the only reason why scientists stick to heliocentric model is social, arguments for that model persuaded the field that this is science project worth advancing.
I just want to understand this, sir: Every time a theory is revealed to be based on evidence that fails to replicate in this fair city, I have to compensate the person?
It’s hard to argue against what you’ve said here professor. Still I’m also of the opinion that our mental and behavioral sciences languish given that they still lack a basic understanding for what drives the conscious form of function. What constitutes the value of existing as you, or someone else, or a society of penguins? Technically this question resides under the domain of philosophy, though philosophers eschew it to instead ponder “morality”, or a supposed rightness to wrongness from which to judge one’s behavior. I consider this to be an evolved social tool of persuasion that may largely be responsible for preventing central mental and behavioral scientists from yet realizing that value ultimately resides as feeling good rather than bad. (Conversely non-central economists have been able to use this premise to develop a vast collection of professionally undisputed models).
I quite doubt that your hero, Arie Kruglanski, posits anything as radical as this. But in addition to your observations about how to potentially build quality theory, I bet he simply realizes that these fields remain crippled by their dearth of effective basic theory so far and is therefore trying to call attention to the problem. So perhaps the two of you aren’t nearly as misaligned as you’ve been postulating?
Love this! We need more journals solely encouraging the publication of great descriptive research regardless. This is worth aligning incentives around.
Love this! We need more journals solely encouraging the publication of great descriptive research regardless of study outcomes. This is worth aligning incentives around.
Nice. This sort of awareness is lacking in other disciplines too. People so badly desire to eliminate uncertainty that they’ll make up just about anything to avoid the experience.
I was going to add a comment on the role of hastily concocted theories as a quick (and self-reinforcing) fix for uncertainty aversion but I see you already did. Consider your comment “+1”ed 😎
What if the problem isn't too little or too many but rather no appreciation of what genuine theory should offer–predictive power, underlying mechanisms, falsifiable hypotheses? To take the example you used, stereotype threat describes outcomes but does not provide deep explanatory mechanisms beyond pointing to anxiety and cognitive load.
Attributing anthropological notions rooted in culture, language, and social cognition–in our case, stereotypes–to direct physiological responses conflates subjective cultural constructs with objective biological mechanisms. It's a clear-cut category error between subjective versus objective domains.
What actually triggers the physiological response is not the stereotype itself, but rather an internal representation—the person’s mental model, anticipation of judgment, self-monitoring, or anxiety. Attributing physiological effects to stereotypes without intermediates is an epistemological misstep.
What the field needs is the foresight to spot these nuances early on before wasting precious time and resources on extensive empirical data and rigorous testing disproving an isolated theory which is actually better conceptualized as a culturally-mediated psychological phenomenon manifesting physiologically via universal mechanisms. Stereotype threat didn't spectacularly fail as a theory, but rather the field spectacularly failed in ever recognizing it as one.
“Popper used to begin his lecture course on the philosophy of science by asking the students simply to ‘observe.’ Then he would wait in silence for one of them to ask what they were supposed to observe… Scientific observation is impossible without pre-existing knowledge… Therefore, theory has to come first. It has to be conjectured, not derived.”
— David Deutsch, The Beginning of Infinity, p. 403
The essay is deeply Popperian, whether it knows it or not. The critique of premature theory canonization and the call to return to careful, humble description are exactly Popper’s core message: theories must be conjectured and criticized, not installed as dogma.
The problem isn’t theory itself, but when the theory outruns and doesn’t seek criticism. When we become invested in its elegance, not its falsifiability.
Observation without theory is blind.
Theory without Popperian falsifiability is blinding.
One of things that I really liked about affective (and cognitive) neuroscience when I started delving into it in the 2000’s was how data-grounded it was. Very few researchers were out to prove theoretical positions, and there was a refreshing absence of grand theories (such as Piaget’s in child psychology). It had struck me that some of the most influential theories, the ones always included in the textbooks, had relatively little empirical support (and in some cases, were unfallsifiable). Theories can be very useful in organizing data into a larger structure and in pointing possible ways forward, but I agree with you, there’ve been too many theories put forward in psychology before they’ve been validated and more fully developed. Perhaps the real problem is not that they’ve been put forward, but that they’ve been widely disseminated and “popularized” before they merit it.
Genuine question: Are there theoretical social psychologists & experimental social psychologists, Michael? Or are they sort of mish-mashed together?
I ask because in physics we have two main branches: theoretical physics and experimental physics. Theoretical physicists spend all day trying to come up with new theories, and experimental physicists test those theories to see which ones cut the mustard (or rather, which ones do not). While theoretical physicists and experimental physicists do work together, they have distinct roles. They are separate careers, with separate conferences, and separate research groups.
When you write:
"When does an effect occur? How robust is it? What are its boundary conditions? These aren't trivial questions."
In my mind, you are describing an experimental scientist, or, at least, that is what popped up in my head!
Great question, Alex. In social psychology there is no split between theorists and experimentalists, but many of us have often pined for such a world. Instead, we're expected to be good at both, but the result is often thar we're often middling at both!
Please write more about the science of motivation! It is faintly hilarious that it’s unclear from your text if you volunteered lead an organization that studies motivation, or just abided.
LOL! You are picking up the right vibes, Steve. Are you familiar with the story of the gentile who goes to his town's rabbi because he wants to convert to Judaism? The rabbis slams the door on this poor soul's face. The gentile keeps coming back, getting the door slammed in his face again and again. Finally, after months of this, the rabbi opens the door and says "Fine, you're clearly serious about this." Except in my case, I was the rabbi. The Society kept asking me to be president, I kept saying no, and eventually I was like "Fine, you're clearly serious about this." Let's say I was testing their motivation. And, yes, you can call me your rabbi.
Serious question: is there any good lay person research introducing the current research understanding of motivation?
It seems particularly interesting because it’s an area where there is a huge amount of lay opinion, we have all these words for it (type A, go getter), but I poked around and the professional seemed very weak!
What is “motivation” or “drive”? Why does it seem to be related to coffee?
How do philosophers and psychologists view it differently than normal people? Why are “driven” people often driven in unrelated fields, like medicine and marathons, etc.
Was the Dude motivated?
Rabbi, give us your wisdom!
The dude was definitely not motivated. But, all your questions are great and I don't think I have any good answers. Perhaps my first real act as president will be to put together a symposium on what the hell motivation even is! Here is one paper I like that exposes the vacuousness of the concept: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/38232956/
I imagine the interview went like this: “Are you employed, sir? You’re not dressed like this on a weekday are you? “
You might like this podcast: two psychologist four beers. ;)
any thoughts on their recent episode with a new theory first approach paradigm for psychology?
I must admit that I have not listened to it yet...but when Yoel told me about it, I was less than impressed by what I heard. From his telling, it sounded like they reinvented cybernetics without realizing it...
And they were explicit that much of it was not new. Even so, just bringing cybernetics back to a new generation is fine by me!
E.g. I observe psychologists don’t seem to value how much life is played as a “repeat game”, somehow preferring a statistical or static perspective.
(For example behavior in the “marshmallow test” versus marshmallows at home. )
May be a side effect of doing science. I have empathy, but as a lay person, it’s interesting that most of the research could be way wrong.
„You need some provisional hypotheses to know what's worth studying, what’s worth observing.” - recently I often think about one class of philosophy of science about problem of induction. Because it’s not logically possible to make any conclusions from the past what will happen in the future, it’s also not possible to falsify something definitively. Therefore it’s not right or wrong answer to the question of what’s worth studying, because hypothesis rejected in the past still can come true in the future - the only valid reason to choose one hypothesis over another or one science project over another (even if this is heliocentrism over geocentrism) is subjective perception what is most likely to bring useful results and advance science.
I’d like to elaborate further: that class delivered absolutely mindbreaking revelation, that the only reason why scientists stick to heliocentric model is social, arguments for that model persuaded the field that this is science project worth advancing.
I really like idea that we need to agree on set of facts first and then forming opinions, theories
Big Beautiful Theories
Glad you caught that!
Currently we have researchers regarding philosophical imaginings as theories, and then constructing studies designed to avoid the nil hypothesis.
We desperately need to stop calling this stuff “theory”.
I just want to understand this, sir: Every time a theory is revealed to be based on evidence that fails to replicate in this fair city, I have to compensate the person?
And a good day to you, sir.
It’s hard to argue against what you’ve said here professor. Still I’m also of the opinion that our mental and behavioral sciences languish given that they still lack a basic understanding for what drives the conscious form of function. What constitutes the value of existing as you, or someone else, or a society of penguins? Technically this question resides under the domain of philosophy, though philosophers eschew it to instead ponder “morality”, or a supposed rightness to wrongness from which to judge one’s behavior. I consider this to be an evolved social tool of persuasion that may largely be responsible for preventing central mental and behavioral scientists from yet realizing that value ultimately resides as feeling good rather than bad. (Conversely non-central economists have been able to use this premise to develop a vast collection of professionally undisputed models).
I quite doubt that your hero, Arie Kruglanski, posits anything as radical as this. But in addition to your observations about how to potentially build quality theory, I bet he simply realizes that these fields remain crippled by their dearth of effective basic theory so far and is therefore trying to call attention to the problem. So perhaps the two of you aren’t nearly as misaligned as you’ve been postulating?
Also conceptual analysis alongside description (what are we actually talking about, what are we interested in describing in order to theorize better).