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Dr. Jake Tuber's avatar

Thanks for this!

I’m curious how the relationship between the arguer and the issue — to what extent does that impact the fallaciousness of the whataboutism?

To use some examples you reference, if one criticizes a Republican congressman’s defense of Trump’s documents handling and they in turn scream about Hunter Biden, that seems like unjustifiable whataboutism. In part, I suspect, because they are irrevocably attached to the issue. The deflection seems like unfair misdirection.

Whereas pressing “what about Sudan?” To a random American supporting the Palestinian cause (who let’s assume is otherwise untouched directly by either conflict), at face, does not seem like quite as fallacious a counterargument, as that person is opting into a moral issue with a degree of randomness (relative to them) that seems more valid to criticize with a whataboutist redirection.

So I’m curious how one’s relationship to the issue being discussed (and therefore their hypocrisy in being selective), plays a role, if any?

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Roy Schulman's avatar

There is an interesting relationship between Whataboutism and the valid argument of Reductio ad Absurdum (RA). In RA, one shows that accepting the argument leads to unacceptable conclusions (in math a strightforward contradiction, in regular conversation, simply a conclusion the other party is unwilling to accept). Whataboutism is similar: if you are "condeming X, you should also accept condemning Y. If you do not, then your logic is flawed".

What makes Whataboutism a fallacy (assuming X and Y are equivalent, otherwise the problem is one of False Equivalence, not just Whataboutism) is the subtle logical move from "you should also accept condeming Y" to "you should have also actively condemned Y", which is not a logical necessity, since acceptance of condemnation does not neccesitate active condemnation

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